

IS THERE AN «ANTICAUSATIVE» COMPONENT IN THE SEMANTICS OF DECAUSATIVES?*

Elena V. Paducheva (Moscow)

Abstract. In this paper Russian decausatives are claimed to be formed from those causative verbs that allow non-agentive subjects, so that the main difference between decausatives and passives is that a decausative excludes participation of a volitional Agent in the concept of the situation. Decausativization is presented as a shift of diathesis, which promotes the Object of a causative verb (with non-agentive subject) to the Subject position but preserves the Causer as an adjunct. The adjunct Causer, if not specified and thus irrelevant, may be deleted by means of a rule analogous to that responsible, e.g., for Unspecified Object deletion. The «Anticausative» analysis of decausatives, according to which decausatives denote a change that can take place spontaneously, is rejected: it is demonstrated that spontaneity of change is not an obligatory feature in the semantics of decausatives.

1. Decausatives

Decausatives have attracted much attention in recent years (see, e.g., Comrie 1985, Haspelmath 1993, Levin and Rappaport Hovav 1995), both in typological perspective and language-specifically¹. The present contribution offers an analysis of such constructions in Russian, a language for which this subject has remained, by and large, unexplored.

The decausative, i.e. intransitive, use of transitive causative verbs, is a phenomenon widely spread in languages all over the world: decausativization is a productive model of semantic – or lexical – derivation. In examples (1) and (2), the verbs in sentences (1b) and (2b) are decausatives:

- (1) a. Džon *otkryl* okno.
 John_{NOM} open_{PAST} window_{ACC}
 ‘John *opened* the window.’

* This material is based upon work supported in part by the National Science foundation under Grant No. BCS-9905748. I am grateful to Wayles Browne, Vjaceslav V. Ivanov, Barbara Partee, Anna Wierzbicka and, above all, to two anonymous referees for their immensely valuable comments concerning the first version of this paper.

¹ Terminology is in need of unification. My choice of the term «decausative» reflects the analysis that I am going to put forward.

- (1) b. Okno *otkrylos'*.
 window_{NOM} open_{SJA.PAST}
 'The window *opened*.'
- (2) a. Vanja razbil okno.
 Vanja_{NOM} break_{PAST} window_{ACC}
 'Vanja broke the window.'
- b. Okno razbilos'.
 window_{NOM} break_{SJA.PAST}
 'The window broke.'

In Russian a decausative is marked by the reflexive particle *-sja* (with the allomorph *-s'*). In English the decausative use of a verb is morphologically unmarked. But as far as meanings of decausatives are concerned, these two languages are very much alike. In this paper Russian examples are accompanied by English translations. Italics is used to show correspondences between a Russian word and its English translation wherever necessary. Glosses are used when morphology is at stake. Purely semantic issues are sometimes demonstrated on English examples.

Decausatives are derived from causatives. So I begin with what it means to be a causative verb. The definition may be given in semantic terms: a CAUSATIVE verb describes a situation in which some participant, say X, undergoes some change, and this change is caused by another participant, say Y. With a TRANSITIVE causative verb the participant Y is denoted by its subject and the participant X appears on the surface as the Object. From now on I deal only with transitive causative verbs. About intransitive causative verbs there is always some doubt whether they are really causative, as, e.g., is the case with Russian sound verbs, such as, e.g., *groxotat* 'rattle':

- (2) c. Studenty *groxočut* kruzhkami.
 students_{NOM.PL} rattle_{PRES} mugs_{INST}
 'The students *are rattling* their mugs'.

The analysis has been limited to verbs in the Perfective aspect, where decausatives are not homonymous with passives (in modern Russian) – a decausative in the Perfective aspect is marked with the reflexive particle *-sja*, while Passive is an analytic form based on the Past Participle:

- (3) a. Dver' *otkrylas'*. [otkrylas' – a decausative]
 door_{NOM} open_{SJA.PAST}
 'The door *opened*.'

- (3) b. Dver' *byla* nakonec *otkryta*. [*byla otkryta* – passive form]
 door_{NOM} be_{PAST} at last open_{PAST.PART.}
 ‘At last the door *was opened*.’

In the Imperfective aspect both decausatives and passives are marked with *-sja*, so the Imperfective form is usually ambiguous. Take as an example the familiar warning of the Moscow metro:

- (4) Ostorozhno, dveri *zakryvajutsja!*
 Be careful doors_{NOM} close_{SJA.PRES}
 ‘Be careful, the doors are closing / are being closed!’

Strangely enough, Russian grammars, both theoretical and of practical orientation (such as Wade 2000), never include decausatives in the list of possible interpretations of *sja*-verbs. One reason for that may be that up to the middle of the 19th century, the *sja*-form in Perfective contexts, such as *Dver' zakrylas'*, could be interpreted as passive (see Bulaxovskij 1954:315), and sporadically we are faced with this use even later (see Janko-Trinitinskaja 1962: 141-143, where, unfortunately, many examples from literature of the 19th and 20th centuries should have been marked as ungrammatical, which is not done). Another reason for this myopia towards decausatives may be that traditional grammars of Russian tend to take into consideration only Imperfective verb forms, while the semantics of a decausative, as I hope to demonstrate, manifests itself only in the Perfective.

The following questions arise in connection with Russian decausatives.

- 1. Which causative verbs may have a derived decausative?** In fact, why is the decausative use possible for *zakryt'* ‘close’ in (5) and impossible for *zaperet' na zasov* ‘to bolt’ in (6) or for *prinesti* ‘to bring’ in (7)?

- (5) a. John *zakryl* dver'. b. Dver' *zakrylas'*.
 ‘John *closed* the door.’ ‘The door *closed*’.
- (6) a. On *zaperet* dver' na zasov. b. *Dver' *zaperlas'* na zasov.
 ‘He *bolted* the door.’ door_{NOM} bolt_{SJA.PAST}
- (7) a. On *prines* chashku. b. *Chashka *prineslas'*.
 ‘He brought the cup.’ cup_{NOM} bring_{SJA.PAST}

- 2. How can the meaning of a decausative be derived from the meaning of the motivating causative verb?** An ambitious project of ours called «Lexicographer» (and partly described in Kustova and Pa-

ducheva 1994; Paducheva 1998) aims at presenting verbal meanings by means of semantic formulas from which many relevant features of verb's behavior can be deduced – such as syntactic arguments and adjuncts, aspectual meaning paradigm, prosody, etc. As to their general shape, these meaning definitions are similar to the «scenarios» introduced by Anna Wierzbicka (see Wierzbicka 1996: 420; Goddard 1998: 70).

So, the question can be reformulated as follows: is there a rule building the semantic formula of a decausative on the basis of that of its motivating causative verb?

3. What is the semantic difference between decausatives and passives? In particular, what is the meaning difference between *otkrylas'* and *byla otkryta* in (3)?

Trying to answer these questions has led us to compare causative *razbit'* 'break' in (2a) with its corresponding decausative in (2b) and find minimal differences between the two uses of this verb:

(2) a. Vanja **razbil** okno. b. Okno **razbilos'**.

A. Difference in TAXONOMIC CATEGORY² of the verb: sentence (2a) can be understood as a volitional action (imagine that Vanja is a burgler), while (2b) is definitely a HAPPENING (the term «happening», introduced in Wierzbicka 1980: 177, denotes a non-controlled change, or a non-agentive achievement). In fact, the most conspicuous feature of decausatives is that they are non-agentive. A prototypical causative verb (such as *to kill*, *to break*, *to open* etc.) is a verb of ACTION³. Meanwhile, a decausative denotes something that took place not because that was the intention of some Agent. In this respect decausatives differ both from passives and reflexives (all the three can be marked identically by particle *-sja* in Russian); for example, *Ja umyl-sja* = 'I washed myself' means that I did it deliberately, that this was my intention. On the predominant agentivity of reflexives see Wierzbicka 1996: 415; agentivity of passives is beyond doubt in Russian.

² Taxonomic (or ontological) categories differ from Vendler's verb class in that they reflect not only aspectual characteristics of a verb but also ^{control} (agentivity). Vendler was not interested in distinctions connected with control; he mostly took verbs with human subjects into consideration. So Vendler's classification doesn't make a clear distinction, e.g., between action and happening. The list of taxonomic categories relevant for Russian verbs is given in Paducheva 1996: 122.

³ DeLancey 1984 can be credited for the idea that «prototypical» causative verbs are agentive; see also Wierzbicka 1996: 420.

B. Difference in DIATHESIS (i.e. voice, not necessarily marked in the verb form; on diathesis see Mel’čuk and Xolodovich 1970). I treat decausatives as generated from causative verbs by means of a DIATHETIC SHIFT – decausativization. In the diathetic shift, participants with defined semantic roles change their syntactic positions and, consequently, COMMUNICATIVE RANKS. Three ranks are distinguished in Paducheva 1997: Center (corresponding to the syntactic positions of Subject and Object); Periphery⁴ (Instrumental and Prepositional Phrase); and Off Screen; this last rank is ascribed to a participant which is not projected to the surface argument structure of the sentence.

In example (8) the verb in (8b) is a decausative of that in (8a):

- (8) a. Reorganizacija *uveličila* transportnye rasxody
 reorganization_{NOM} increase_{PAST} transportation_{ADJ} expenses_{ACC}
 kompanii.
 company_{GEN}
 ‘The reorganization *increased* transportation expenses of the company.’
- b. Ot reorganizacii transportnye rasxody
 from reorganization_{GEN} transportation expenses_{NOM}
 kompanii *uveličilis’*.
 company_{GEN} increase_{SJA.PAST}
 ‘With the reorganization transportation expenses of the company *increased*.’

In (8a), with a causative verb *uveličila*, the Causer occupies the position of a grammatical Subject and belongs to the communicative Center; in (8b), with a decausative *uveličilis’* it is demoted from its position in the Center and moved to the Periphery -- in fact, the Causer is expressed on the surface as a Prepositional Phrase (PP). Meanwhile, the former Object of the causative verb *transportnye rasxody kompanii* is promoted to the position of the Subject.

The PP expressing the Causer very often consists of *ot* + Genitive⁵, cf. (9a) and (9b):

⁴ The opposition Center / Periphery goes back to Roman Jakobson’s distinctions of central and peripheral cases.

⁵ DeLancey (1984: 205) comments the English *from* (which may be used in the same sense) as being «one of many examples of the semantical connection between the category of cause and that of spacial source». Note that Russian *ot* ‘from’ in this context usually has negative connotations, see Iordanskaja and Mel’čuk 1996.

- (9) a. Vnezapnyj poryv vetra *zakryl* balkonnuju dver'
 'A sudden gust of wind *closed* the balcony door';
 b. Balkonnaja dver' *zakrylas*' ot vnezapnogo poryva vetra
 'The balcony door *closed* because of a sudden gust of wind'.

Diathetic shift, which changes the communicative ranks of participants, can be looked upon as a shift of the focus of attention (see, e.g., the demotion of the Causer in (8) and (9) from its central position to the Periphery), and in this sense a kind of metonymy shift. As any other meaning shift, it has its own semantic derivation model, see Paducheva 1998 on semantic shifts and their models.

Note that what is called «causative alternation» in Levin, Rappaport 1995 is presented here as a UNIDIRECTIONAL meaning shift from a causative verb to a decausative.

Decausativization opens a new syntactic position in the surface case frame of a verb, namely, that of the so-called Background (= Peripheral) Causer, see *ot reorganizacii* 'with the reorganization' in (8b) or *ot vnezapnogo poryva vetra* in (9b). In fact, PP «*ot* + Genitive», denoting a Background Causer, cannot appear in the context of a transitive causative sentence, so (10a) is possible, while (10b) is not:

- (10) a. Strana *razorilas*' ot postojannyx vojn
 country_{NOM} ruin_{SJA.PAST} from perpetual wars_{GEN}
 'The country *got ruined* from perpetual wars';
 b. *Korol' *razoril* stranu ot postojannyx vojn
 king_{NOM} ruin_{PAST} country_{ACC} from perpetual wars.

In this respect decausativization resembles passivization, which opens the syntactic position of the Instrumental (in Russian terminology – «agentivnoe dopolnenie», agentive complement); in fact, this slot doesn't exist for the active form.

- C. The last feature that differentiates a decausative from its corresponding causative concerns optional vs. obligatory status of the participant Causer in the CONCEPT (= conceptual structure) of the situation provided by the verb⁶. Let us return to example (8). In the context of a causative verb, as in (8a), the Causer is obligatory – in an ordinary predicative use of a verb the subject position must obligatory be filled. Meanwhile, in the context of a decausative the Causer is expressed by

⁶ On CONCEPTUAL STRUCTURE and CONCEPTUALIZATION see, e.g. Jackendoff 1990: 45; Wierzbicka 1996: 410.

a PP, and this syntactic position, generally speaking, is optional; cf. (8b), with the Causer, and (8c), where the Causer doesn’t show on the surface:

- (8) c. Transportnye rasxody kompanii *uveličilis*
 ‘Travel expenses of the company *increased*’.

We’ll discuss the optionality of the Causer in section 4; and now let us consider the taxonomic category of a decausative.

If, in fact, decausativization is a diathetic shift it is not expected to change the verb’s taxonomic category⁷. So it is reasonable to suppose that decausatives, happenings themselves, are formed from those uses of causative verbs that already denote happenings. Consequently, a separate meaning shift is postulated – DEAGENTIVIZATION, with a separate semantic derivation model. Such verbs as *razbudit* ‘wake up’, *otkryt* ‘open’, *zakryt* ‘close’, *umen’sit* ‘diminish’ etc. when used with a non-agentive Subject are treated as separate lexemes – with a shifted lexical meaning.

In accordance with this analysis we present decausativization as consisting of three separate derivations: (1) deagentivation; (2) decausativation proper; (3) Background Causer deletion.

Example (11) demonstrates the effect of deagentivization, cf. agentive (11a) and non-agentive (11b):

- (11) a. Ivan *razbudil* menja grubym pinkom.
 Ivan_{NOM} wake_{PAST} me_{ACC} rude kick_{INST}
 ‘Ivan *woke* me with a rude kick.’
- b. Zvonok v dver’ *razbudil* menja.
 ringing_{NOM} IN door wake_{PAST} me_{ACC}
 ‘The ringing of the doorbell *woke* me up.’

Semantic formulas (11a’) and (11b’) below are «Lexicographer» style meaning representations for *razbudit*’ in (11a) and (11b). The semantic formula of a word consists of three zones:

- I. Arguments;
- II. Taxonomic category;
- III. Semantic decomposition.

Semantic decomposition is a sequence of syntactically independent semantic components. A semantic component is a predicative unit of a meaning definition. Components are assigned ASSERTIVITY STATUS, which

⁷ Passives, for example, denote actions, as well as their active correlates do.

determines the behavior of a component in a wider context. For example, the status of presupposition predicts the component's immunity to negation, and this is what opposes presuppositions to assertions (though, presumably, presuppositions are not the only kind of non-assertive components). In section 3 a special INFERENTIAL status will be introduced.

Rank oppositions are represented by typographic means: components written in bold correspond to participants of Central rank and themselves belong to the Center; others belong to the Periphery (on the connection between roles of participants and semantic components of the meaning representation see, e.g., Jackendoff 1990: 60, Paducheva 1997). Components which are optional, i.e. may be absent in some uses of a word, are put into brackets.

(11') a. Y *woke* X [action] =

I. *Arguments:*

	rank	role	taxonomic class
Y	Subject	Agent	PERSON
X	Object	Patient	LIVING BEING
(Z)	Periphery	Manner	ACTION

II. *Taxonomic category of the verb:* action

III. *Semantic decomposition:*

Background Exposition: X was sleeping <presupposition>
Center **Causer: Y acted on purpose** <presupposition>
(Manner: applying Z)
this caused <assertion>
New state: X does not sleep <implication>

Inferences —

(11') b. Y *woke* X [happening] =

I. *Arguments:*

	rank	role	taxonomic class
Y	Subject	Causer	EVENT
X	Object	Patient	LIVING BEING

II. *Taxonomic category:* happening

III. *Semantic decomposition:*

Background Exposition: X was sleeping <presupposition>
Center **Causer: Y took place** <presupposition>
Manner: —
this caused <assertion>
New state: X does not sleep <implication>

Inferences —

As we see, deagentivization is, essentially, a categorial shift (cognate to metaphor; in fact, metaphor is, from a logical point of view, a category mistake).

Now I am ready to answer the first question – which causative verbs decausativize and which don't. As a rule, decausatives are formed from those causative verbs that can take non-agentive subjects. Compare (5a) and (9a). The verb *zakryt'* 'close' doesn't exclude a non-agentive subject, see (9a); whence a decausative use is possible for *zakryt'* in (9b). While the semantics of *zaperet' na zasov* 'to bolt', see example (6), implies the use of an instrument (namely, the bolt), which, in its turn, presupposes an Agent manipulating with it; thus, for *zaperet' na zasov* deagentivization is blocked, and so is decausativization.

As for deagentivization, I follow Levin, Rappaport 1995 in distinguishing CHANGE OF STATE VERBS (such as *close*, *break*, which specify only the resulting state) and VERBS OF MANNER <of action> (such as *lock*, *cut*, *sweep*). Verbs of manner specify the activity of the Agent (not necessarily leading to a result set beforehand); the Agent's intentions and evaluations, instruments he uses, etc. No wonder that Verbs of manner avoid non-agentive subjects and, consequently, do not decausativize, cf. the analysis of *cut* in Levin and Rappaport 1995: 103. The same with *zaperet' na zasov* in (6).

Or take the Russian verb *udalit'* 'remove' – it doesn't decausativize because of its evaluative component (absent in English, which, according to Levin and Rappaport 1995: 103, also doesn't decausativize, though for *remove* explanation is unclear): one can say *udalit'* only about something excessive, non necessary; something not needed or harmful. And this evaluation needs a subject of consciousness present in the concept of the situation. It can be a tumor or a bad tooth etc.; in the last two cases the activity denoted by *udalit'* is specified as including an operation, which can be performed solely by an Agent, and this is an additional evidence of agentivity of *udalit'*:

(12) Ivan ne lechil zub vo-vremja; teper' ego prišlos' *udalit'*.

'Ivan didn't take care of his tooth in time; now it was necessary to *remove* it.'

In general, if the meaning definition of a causative verb ascribes the Subject participant a role that can only be fulfilled by a volitional being, perhaps, having some skill or ability of using instruments, then a non-agentive Causer is an impossible candidate for the subject of this verb, see Haspelmath 1993 (unless there is an essential meaning shift). A prediction can be made that for such a verb decausativization is impossible. More precisely, if decausativized, the verb will change its meaning, dropping the components that rely upon the agentivity of the subject. Take, for example,

a verb *zatjanut'* from *tjanut'* 'to pull'; its decausative *zatjanut'sja* [e.g., about a meeting] has the meaning 'to take a longer time than was expected': manner of action component disappears and what remains is only the change of state component; the same with *steret'* 'erase' with the decausative *steret'sja*, as in *nadpis' sterlas'* 'the inscription is erased'.

On the contrary, such change of state verbs as *change*, *break*, *increase* decausativize eagerly, see example (8).

Let me emphasize that what hinders deagentivation and, therefore, decausativation of an agentive causative verb is not volition as such but rather the specific manner of influencing the object which can be at the disposal of only a volitional being. Note that some non-agentive Causers can imitate a volitional being in their manner of influencing the object, and such non-agentive subjects are not sufficient for the verb's decausativization to be possible, cf.:

- (13) (a) Veter sorval šapku.
 wind_{NOM} tear_{PAST} cap_{ACC}
 'The wind tore away the cap.'
 (b) *Šapka sorvalas'.
 cap_{NOM} tear._{SJA.PAST}.

Thus, the answer to our first question is: those causative verbs have derived decausatives which allow a non-agentive subject, in particular, those subjected to deagentivization. It goes without saying that causative verbs that are non-agentive in their primary use, such as *istoshchit'* 'exhaust', are the first candidates for decausativization. An important observation had been made in Haspelmath 1993 (see also Levin and Rappaport 1995) – that strictly agentive causative verbs do not decausativize. But this was not enough: we still needed a positive condition under which decausativization is possible. This condition can now be formulated as follows: a causative verb gives rise to a derived decausative if it allows a non-agentive subject.

Special attention must be paid to verbs of movement. The fact is that verbs of movement very unwillingly decausativize. The explanation seems to be that in the Russian picture of the world very many objects (stones, sticks etc.) can move on their own accord. So they get a reflexive interpretation with no Background Causer mentioned or implied. This accounts for *prinesti* in example (7), which, as many other verbs of movement, doesn't decausativize, irrespective of whether they allow non-agentive subject or not.

Now about the second question – how to derive the meaning of a decausative from the meaning of the initial causative verb. As was said above, decausativization of a «prototypical», i.e. primarily agentive causa-

tive verb, goes through two steps: (1), and then (2) decausativization of those verbs that allow non-agentive use. Deagentivization was demonstrated by transition from (11a') to (11b'); the effect decausativization can be seen in comparison of meaning representations for the causative non-agentive *uveličit*' in (8a') and its decausative *uveličit'sja* in (8b'):

(8') a. Y uveličil X =

Background there was some quantity of X <presupposition>

Center **Causer: the event Y took place** <presupposition>
this caused <assertion>

New state: the quantity of X is more than before
<implication>

Inferences —

(8') b. X *uveličilsja* <iz-za Y-a 'because of Y'> =

Background there was some quantity of X <presupposition >
(the event Y took place
this caused:)

Center **New state: the quantity of X is more than before**
<assertion>

Inference Causer is irrelevant <inference by default>

In correspondence with the notion of diathesis, semantic definitions of a causative verb and its derived decausative consist of the same components. What changes is their communicative rank: the causal component belongs to the Center in the meaning decomposition of a causative verb, and the decausativization moves it to the background. The last line in (8b') – Inference – will be discussed in section 4.

To answer the third question, about the difference between decausatives and passives, let us compare (3a) and (3b) again:

(3) a. Dver' **otkrylas**. 'The door **opened**.'

b. Dver' **byla** nakonec **otkryta**. 'At last the door **was opened**.'

Neither (3a) nor (3b) mention the Agent, but the absence of an Agent in the surface structure is interpreted in (3a) and (3b) differently. Sentence (3b) still presupposes the Agent – somebody has opened the door; while (3a) does not. In fact, not only it is the case that decausatives are formed from those verbs that CAN be used with non-agentive subject; more than that: the speaker chooses a decausative for his conceptualization of the situation if (s)he wants to present the situation as having no Agent. For example, in the context of (14) Vanja, most probably, was the one who opened the door; but the speaker, using a decausative, wants to dwell on the moment when this fact was not yet clear for an imaginary Observer:

(14) The door opened and Vanja came in.

Or take example (15): John is the Agent of the situation described by the verb *threw*, but not *broke*, which is a decausative; in fact, in (15) John could throw the cup on the floor in order to check whether it is unbreakable as it was claimed to be, so his intention would not have been to break it, which is necessary in order for *John* to be the Agent of *broke*:

(15) John threw the cup on the floor and it *broke*.

In example (16) (suggested by Barbara Partee, personal communication) the Agent is present in the context of the decausative *opened*, but not in the concept of the situation created by the decausative itself:

(16) After all of **our** pushing and shoving on it, when the door finally **opened**, it turned out there was nothing at all inside.

Here, as in (15), «we» (*our* being the possessive of *we*) is the Agent of pushing and shoving, but not of the opening of the door. Thus, the concept provided for a situation by a decausative contains no participant with the semantic role of Agent, irrespective of whether the Agent was present in the world where all the events took place.

2. Decausatives and their semantic neighbors

Let's now see what happens when *-sja* is added to an unambiguously actional Perfective verb, as in (16), (17). Under certain conditions *sja*-form may still get a coerced interpretation. But it is not a coerced decausative:

(17) Plan sostavilsja sam soboj.
 plan_{NOM} draw_{SJA.PAST} SAM itself_{INST}
 'The plan *drew itself up*.'

(18) *Vorota *zaperlis'* v 12 chasov.
 gate_{NOM} lock_{SJA.PAST} in 12 o'clock
 'The gate *locked* at 12 o'clock.'

Sentence (18) is ungrammatical in Modern Russian; in fact, passive interpretation of reflexive verbs is impossible in the Perfective aspect, while decausative interpretation is excluded in the context of a strictly agentive verb (agentive interpretation in (18) is supported by the adverbial denoting exact time). Meanwhile, (17) is acceptable. The fact is that the verb in (17) is not a decausative; (17) means, approximately, 'the new state (with the

existing plan) was achieved with the minimal effort on the part of the Agent’, i.e. ‘*as if* by itself’. The meaning of the verb is such that the implied Agent is necessarily present in the speaker’s conceptualization of the situation; in fact, it is this implied Agent who is the BENEFICIARY of the change of state that took place.

The meaning of the Perfective *-sja* form in (17) can be called PASSIVE-POTENTIAL (suggestion of V.A.Plungjan). It constitutes an intermediate stage in the semantic derivation of the construction «the book sells well», which are exemplified in Russian below:

- (19) Mašina xorošo/ ploxo **zavoditsja**.
‘The car *starts* easily/with difficulty.’
- (20) Pjatna ot čaja xorošo/ploxo **otstiryvajutsja**.
‘Stains of tea *wash away* easily/with difficulty.’

In fact, according to the analysis presented in Spencer 1998, the semantics of this construction includes two ideas – modality and generalization (of the Agent). In the Russian Perfective forms, such as (19’), (20’), modality is already present:

- (19’) mašina **zavelas’** = ‘Somebody MANAGED to start the car.’
- (20’) pjatno **otstiralos’** = ‘Somebody MANAGED to wash out the stain.’

While generalized interpretation (universal quantification over the Agent) is achieved only in the course of imperfectivization:

- (19) ‘the car is such that it is easy/difficult to start.’
- (20) ‘stains of tea are easy/difficult to wash away.’

Thus, the *sja*-verb in (17), as well as in (19’), (20’), is not a decausative: it differs from «the book sells well»-type of use only in that it is in the Perfective and lacks quantification.

Now the only example still in need of an explanation is (8c): a decausative with a background Causer missing. The relationship between (8b) and (8c) is considered in section 4, and in order to describe this relationship we need the notion of inference.

3. Implicature and inference

In terms that are now widely accepted, the difference between implicatures and inferences consists in that IMPLICATURES are conveyed by the speaker who creates the message, while INFERENCES are made by the addressee who interprets it (see, e.g., Brown & Yule 1983: 33). I shall take the part of the addressee and in this way avoid mentioning implicatures altogether. In fact, the term implicature is burdened by multifarious connotations and non-distinctive epithets (such as «conventional» implicature; «generalized» implicature, e.a.), which do not guarantee mutual comprehension.

As for inferences, they can be divided into two classes, provisionally called here SEMANTIC and PRAGMATIC inferences.

PRAGMATIC INFERENCES are those semantic components in the meaning representation of a text that owe their existence to general rules of interpretation of verbal discourse. Pragmatic inference produces meaning components that do not exist in a ready made form in the semantics of either a word or construction of the language in question.

SEMANTIC INFERENCES are semantic components included in the meaning definition of a word in the vocabulary or in the semantic explication of a construction; morphological, prosodic or any other linguistic entity: they are CONVENTIONALLY related to that entity. Semantic inferences are not rule generated – they are already present in this or that part of the description of language, i.e. either in the vocabulary or grammar.

Example below demonstrates the necessity of general rules of pragmatic inference:

- (21) A woman *W* asks her friend *M* not to tell anybody about some event. *M*: A gentleman never tells. Later on it turns out that he did tell. Responding to *W*'s reproach, *M*: I never said I was a gentleman.
(A.Lurie. «Love and friendship»).

Here *W* makes a request. It should be reacted upon by either an agreement or a refusal of the interlocutor. The response of *M*, «A gentleman never tells», in its direct sense, is neither. So the maxim of relevance is violated, and, guided by that maxim, *W* makes a crucial inference: ‘*M* is a gentleman’. After that *W* has, according to the rule of syllogism:

- (22) A gentleman never tells
M is a gentleman; CONSEQUENTLY,
M won't tell.

In this way *W* interprets the reaction of *M* as that of agreement to fulfill the request. Afterwards the crucial inference of *W* is declared by *M* to be

«non-said»); so he is free of his promise – if only at the expense of the acknowledgement that his answer to the request of *W* was incoherent.

No doubt, general rules of pragmatic inference just exemplified, though playing an important role in interpretation of discourse, are best placed outside linguistic semantics *sensu stricto*. Meanwhile, the notion of semantic inference can be used to indicate the assertivity status of a semantic component in the meaning definition of a word or a word form.

4. On the so called «anticausative» component in the semantics of decausatives

Decausatives are sometimes (e.g., in Nedjalkov and Sil’nickij 1969) called «anticausatives», and the state of affairs described by a decausative is claimed to occur SPONTANEOUSLY. I agree with Igor Mel’čuk (1998: 392), who believes that the term «anticausative» is misleading when applied to a decausative. And the idea that decausatives denote spontaneous changes is wrong either. In fact, decausatives do not exclude cause specification, as we saw in examples (8) and (9).

For those contexts where the Background Causer is present in the surface structure of a decausative the diathetic interpretation of the relationship between causative verbs and their derived decausatives was proposed, see section 2. The problem now is, how to account for the semantics of a decausative in the context of the Background Causer missing, as in (1), (2), (8c).

In Plungjan 2000: 214 the effect of a disappearing syntactic valence is accounted for by what is called (INTERPRETIVE) VALENCE-DECREASING DERIVATION (see also Dowty 1979). This kind of derivation is proposed, e.g., for Unspecified Object deletion; for example, sentence (23b), with no Object valence, is derived from (23a); deleted valence is interpreted as implying the presence of some non-specified Object of the verb *to eat* in the concept of situation:

- (23)a. He ate **an apple**.
 b. He ate <something eatable>.

Russian also has Unspecified Subject deletion of the verb, marked by the Plural form of the verb (see Plungjan 2000: 200):

- (24) a. **Voland** *pročel* vaš roman.
 Voland_{NOM} read_{PAST-SG} your novel_{ACC}
 ‘Voland has read your novel.’
 b. *Vaš* roman *pročli*.
 your novel_{ACC} read_{PAST-PL}
 ‘Indefinite person has read your novel’.

We propose that Background Causer valence of a decausative be treated in the same way. The problem is whether, when the Background Causer is omitted in the surface structure, the semantic participant Causer is still present in the concept of situation or it disappears. In examples (23) and (24) it was clear that the semantic participant remains. In the case of example (8c) this is not obvious. In general, when the Background Causer of a decausative is absent this may mean that the cause of the change is either irrelevant (unknown or unimportant or trivial) or non-existent. Which exactly of the listed reasons is responsible for deletion of the Background Causer may be difficult to say; the Causer seems to be implied in (a), but not in (b) or (c):

- (25) (a) Moe terpen'e istoščilos'.
 my patience_{NOM} exhaust_{SJA}
 'My patience is exhausted.'
- (b) Poslednjaja nadežda utratilas'.
 last hope_{NOM} lose_{SJA.PAST}
 'The last hope is lost.'
- (c) U nego *probudilsja* interes k muzyke
 at him wake.up._{SJA.PAST} interest_{NOM} to music
 'Interest in music awakened in him'.

In example (26), from Levin, Rappaport 1995: 105, it is highly improbable that the speaker has the «scientific cause» in mind; rather, the situation is conceptualized as having no cause:

- (26) The day **lengthened** 'the day became longer as the earth progressed through a certain part of its orbit'.

So my proposal is to treat the missing Background Causer as a case of interpretive valence-decreasing derivation, the missing Background Causer giving rise to a semantic component 'Causer is irrelevant / non-existent' (= 'there is no cause the speaker has in mind'). In this way the anticausative inference 'there is no external cause' = 'it happened by itself' must be taken into consideration as one of the possibilities. The only caveat is that, contrary to what is assumed in «anticausative» treatment of decausatives, this possibility is not even the most common one.

In Levin and Rappaport 1995 (108) it is suggested that existential quantification can give an account of the absent participant Causer in contexts like (1b), (2b): "Suppose that the intransitive form of externally caused verbs arises from binding the external cause within the lexical semantic representation, where this binding is interpreted as existential quantifica-

tion.” It follows from what is said above that in the (b) sentences of examples (1), (2), with missing Background Causer, the situation is conceptualized as non-committal about the participant Causer; meanwhile, existential quantification over Causers implies that the speaker perceives a Causer as inevitably existing, which is not the case.

The component ‘Causer is irrelevant / nonexistent’ should be ascribed a special assertivity status – that of an INFERENCE. In fact, this component enters the semantic representation of a verb in case when no Causers are mentioned in the utterance or the context. For example, in (9b) the inference is blocked in the context of the Background Causer:

- (9) b. Balkonnaja dver’ *zakrylas*’ ot vnezapnogo poryva vetra.
‘The balcony door *closed* because of a sudden gust of wind.’

In general, the inference ‘Causer is irrelevant / nonexistent’ is blocked by any possible kind of causal context:

- (27) a. You intentionally arranged it that my cup *broke*.
b. The cup *broke* because you put it on the very edge of the table.
c. He threw the cup on the floor, so it *broke*, etc.

In (28a) the causal connection between the behavior of the mouse and the fate of the egg is also realized, so the component «Causer irrelevant» in the meaning representation of the verb would have led to a contradictory meaning representation of the text as a whole; the same in (28b):

- (28) a. Myška bežala, xvostikom maxnula, jaičko upalo i razbilos’.
(Russian tale)
‘A mouse was running by, she waved her little tail, the egg fell down and *broke*.’
b. Brat’ja udarilis’ ob zemlju i *sdelalis*’ dobrymi molodcami.
(Russian tale)
‘Brothers struck the earth and *transformed* into fine fellows.’

Thus, we see that the inference ‘Causer irrelevant/ nonexistent’ is blocked in any contradicting context, and it is in this sense that this component can be said to have inferential status – the status of a cancelable inference.

If this analysis is correct then Adjunct deletion (and Background Causer is, clearly, an Adjunct) is explained by the same kind of interpretive valence-decreasing derivations as Argument deletion.

At first sight the assumption that the semantic participant Causer may be absent contradicts the natural:

Axiom of causality: Any change has a cause.

But the fact is that both the Causer of a non-agentive verb and the background Causer of a decausatives denote EXTERNAL causes; there are INTERNAL causes that can do the job.⁸

The account suggested for decausatives provides a solution to an important problem (posed in Wierzbicka 1980: 173) concerning the semantics of MEDIUM verbs, such as *sgnit* ‘decay’, *rastajat* ‘melt’, *vysoxnut* ‘dry’. Medium verbs denote a change of state for which no external cause is necessarily specified. In Benveniste 1972 and Wierzbicka 1980 changes denoted by medium verbs are attributed to an inner cause.

The semantic formula of a medium verb is the same as that of a decausative: medium verbs are, so to say, non-derived decausatives – they have no causative use that can be said to be a primary one for them. If the anticausative component were inherent in the semantics of a medium verb, that is, if, e.g., *X dried* had always meant ‘X dried by itself’, without any external cause (i.e. without any influence from the outside), the semantics of a medium verb couldn’t have been taken as constituting a part in the meaning definition of the corresponding causative verb: for *Y dried X* we would have got a formulation ‘Y caused X dry by itself’, which is self-contradictory. If we acknowledge the inferential nature of «anticausative» component in the semantics of medium, as well as decausative, verbs the problem disappears: the inference ‘Causer irrelevant / nonexistent’ simply won’t arise, because the Causer (Y) is mentioned in the context.

Different but analogous problems would arise if the external Cause of decausatives is recognized as always present: then identification of mediums with decausatives would be a problem, for mediums, being non-derived, have no formal reason to imply a deleted Causer when used either with or without any PP explicitly expressing the cause.

5. ‘I am not to blame’

There is another riddle connected with the semantics of decausatives. It can be demonstrated with the help of examples (29) and (30):

⁸ The terms «external» and «internal» cause are used by different authors, not necessarily in the same meaning; cf. Benveniste 1971: 148; Wierzbicka 1980: 171; Levin and Rapaport 1996: Iordanskaja and Mel’cuk 1996: 165.

- (29) a. Vanja broke the cup [accidentally].
b. The cup broke [by itself].

(30) – *It broke* [about a cup]! – It didn’t just *break*, you *broke* it.

Anna Wierzbicka (1980: 172), discussing the dialogue here numbered as (30), describes the reaction *you broke it* as made «with an emphasis which rejects the sentence *it broke* as a false rather than incomplete report».

Let us look upon these two alternatives more closely. I shall call the first participant of the dialogue (30) C(hild) and the second A(dult) (Wierzbicka qualifies the second speaker in (30) as an «angry adult»).

For *It broke* to be false it is necessary that its meaning contradicts the «true» meaning of *You broke it*. In order to be an «incomplete report» the meaning of *It broke* must only constitute the part of *You broke it*.

The first alternative is correct if we acknowledge the component ‘I am not to blame’ as a potential part of the meaning decomposition of (29b). In fact, the essence of the opposition in (30) can then be schematically presented as having the form

(30’) C: I am not to blame! A: You ARE to blame!

A question arises, whether the component ‘I am not to blame’ is really present in the meaning of *It broke* – at least in the context of (30). And if so, then where does it come from? In other words, what inference can give an account for it.

Surely, the component ‘Y is not to blame’ is not present in the meaning of (29b), so it only can arise on the background of the opposition between (29b) and (29a) manifested in (30) by way of contrast with ‘Y is to blame’ in the meaning of the causative *break*. So we must look for the origin of the component ‘Y is to blame’ in the meaning of the causative *break*.

There are two possible sources for the origin of the component ‘Y is to blame’ in the meaning of *break* – 1) lexical semantics of the verb, and 2) categorial semantics of agency.

- 1) A sentence of the form *Y broke X* literally means ‘Y destroyed the integrity of X’; but, as all verbs of destruction, *broke* invites the inference ‘Y caused damage’; at least verbs of destruction have such an inference in their meaning extension potential. This inference is not valid for every verb in any context. For example, you can break a nutshell in order to get the nutmeat (*Razbej mne orex!*). But in a certain pragmatic context the potential «damage» component of destruction verbs may become essential for the speaker, so the idea of damage will be actualized. In fact, the «angry adult» of (30) is prone to emphasize the damage.

2) On the other hand, there is a special semantics of agency. A scenario of a verb of action includes three components explicating the role of Agent in the semantics of an action verb. For a participant Y to be assigned the role of the Agent it is necessary for Y to take part in the following components of the definition:

- a. 'Y is the source of physical influence';
- b. 'Y is the subject of intention';
- c. 'Y is responsible for the new state coming into existence'⁹.

In the context of an involuntary action, as in (29b), the second component, «intention», is lost. But the third component, «responsibility», is not. Moreover, in the context of actualized damage, as in (30), it is intensified to 'Y is to blame for the damage'.

Now we are ready to discuss the relationship between (29b) and (30). Sentence (29b), with a decausative *broke*, invites the inference of there being no external cause deserving being mentioned, see the component 'Causer is irrelevant' in the meaning of (4b). In the context of damage in (30) this component is extended to 'nobody is responsible for the damage' – due to the opposition with 'Y is to blame for the damage'. Then the opposition in (30) can be schematically presented as having the form (30'). And under this analysis the account of the situation given by C is considered by A to be false.

But there is another way to account for the opposition in (30), which does not require the component 'Y is not to blame' to be present in the meaning of (29b). In fact, the component 'Causer is irrelevant', which we argued for in section 4, cannot be qualified as included in what is SAID by the speaker; it is an inference made by the addressee on the ground that no causes are mentioned in the text or, as we now must add, present in the context. Then we can accept a weaker variant (30'') for the opposition in (30):

(30'') It is not *only* the case that the cup broke; something you were doing was the (physical) cause of it; and as the broken cup is a bad thing you are to blame for it.

If we stick to (30'') then the utterance *It broke* gives an incomplete report of the situation rather than a false one. And in fact, the inserted *just* of example (30) (It didn't *just* break) is an argument towards incompleteness

⁹ «Primary responsibility» is included among the features of the prototypical Agent in Lakoff 1977. On decomposability of the role of Agent see Van Valin & Wilkins 1996; for a 'prototype' view of Agent properties see Dowty 1991.

rather than falsity of *It broke*. Under this analysis ‘Y is to blame’ is present in the meaning of (29a), on the rights of a potential inference actualized by the context of damage, while ‘Y is not to blame’ is not present in the meaning of (29b) at all.

Let us emphasize that in the analysis of example (30) it became important to pay attention to the role of CONTRAST, which non_{ACC}identally finds its place exactly on the boundary between linguistic semantics and the pragmatics that is beyond linguistic semantics.

Example (31) (from Fillmore 1976) is often used to demonstrate Grice’s maxim of quantity. The inference (31b) from the utterance (31a) is made by the hearer on the assumption that the speaker could have made a stronger statement with less linguistic effort had (s)he made the statement about both eyes; the fact that (s)he did not do it makes us believe that the stronger statement is not true:

- (31) a. She can see fine with her left eye;
b. Something is wrong with her right eye.

The same holds for example (32) (from Leech 1983); the reaction of B invites the inference ‘we won’t miss Aunt Agatha’, which is not spoken out for the sake of politeness:

- (32) A. We’ll all miss Bill and Aunt Agatha, won’t we?
B. Well, we’ll all miss BILL.

But the same inferences may be looked upon as constituting the direct meaning of contrast, which reveals itself in intonation and other devices perceptible for a potential addressee. Then contrastive constructions fall within the scope of linguistic semantics, so the inferences connected with them are a challenge for linguistic semantics of the future.

6. Concluding remarks

Thus, to recapitulate, the claim is that there are three separate meaning shifts accounting for the semantic relationship between decausatives and their causative verbs: 1) deagentivization, a categorial shift; 2) decausativization proper – a diathetic shift changing communicative ranks of the participants; and 3) Unspecified Adjunct deletion – interpreting a valence-decreasing derivation. Each of the shifts has an independent motivation and a wide sphere of application outside decausativization.

- 1) Presenting deagentivization as a separate meaning extension rule has the following advantages.

- a. Lexical limits on decausativization are rigorously formulated; namely, those verbs engender derived decausatives that allow non-agentive use. In this way lexical boundaries of decausativization of a causative verb are reduced to those of its deagentivization and need not be stated separately.
- b. Deagentivation, i.e. a lexical rule changing the taxonomic class of the subject, is presented as forming a part of the rule that builds the meaning of the decausative from an agentive causative verb. In this way non-agentivity of decausatives is explicated: it is accounted for by the fact that decausatives are formed from non-agentive causative verbs or non-agentive uses of such verbs.
- c. Treating deagentivization as a separate shift gives us the possibility to present the relationship between a non-agentive causative verb and its decausative as a purely diathetic shift; in fact, both non-agentive causative verb and its decausative denote happenings, so they differ only in the communicative ranks of the participants.

On the other hand, a verb with a non-agentive subject is presented as a separate lexeme, i.e. as a word with a different lexical meaning. In fact, in many respects causative verbs behave differently when used with agentive and non-agentive subjects:

- instrumental action, such as *grubym pinkom* ‘with a rude kick’ in example (11a), is only possible in the context of a verb with an agentive subject;
- on-going process interpretation for the Imperfective is also a prerogative of an agentive verb;
- many adverbs, such as *inadvertently, prudently, intelligently*, combine only with agentive verbs.

And the list is not full. Thus, deagentivization can be said to change the word’s lexical meaning, if only because non-agentive subject of a verb is responsible for many features of its syntactic behavior. There is no other place to pin this information but to a separate lexeme in the lexicon. Perhaps it belongs to the grammar of lexicon which does not yet exist.

In Levin 1993 causative alternation is said to affect change-of-state verbs. At the same time, the class of change of state verbs is defined in this book, more or less, through their participation in causative alternation. So there is a kind of vicious circle. My definition of change of state verbs directly addresses their semantic formula: it is Manner of activity specification that denies a verb its change of state membership. In other words, what differentiates change of state verbs, such as *smestit* ‘change the place of

something’, *porvat* ‘tear’, from those that do not belong to this class, such as *zaperet* ‘lock’, *porezat* ‘cut’, is the fact that the semantic formula of the latter includes specification of the activity, while change of state verbs specify only the final state. Manner specification requires an Agent acting in such and such a way, and a limitation on Manner of action is more natural as a condition on deagentivization than on decausativization. In fact, for decausativization its dependency on Manner specification is more indirect.

- 2) The diathetic approach to decausatives concerns, in the first place, the Participant Causer and causative component in semantic representation. As our analysis shows, the causal component, central in the meaning of a transitive causative verb, is not excluded from the scenario of a decausative. The difference between a decausative and its motivating causative verb concerns the communicative rank of the causative component: in the semantics of a causative verb the causative component belongs to the Center; in the semantics of a decausative it goes to the Background (in the context of a Background Causer) or acquires inferential status (if the Background Causer is omitted).

It is often claimed that for a decausative to exist the change denoted by the verb should be able to take place spontaneously. Our analysis shows that spontaneity is not a necessary condition at all. What is excluded in the situation described by a decausative is the involvement of some person’s will; non-agentive causers aren’t excluded in the least:

Many efforts were made to predict surface case frame of a verb from the roles of the participants, and led to nothing. Absence of direct connection between semantic role and surface case assignment is realized in Croft 1991 (156). The notion of diathesis makes this indirect connection between semantic role and surface case transparent by bringing the communicative ranks of participants into play. Indeed, if the surface case frame of a verb denotes diathesis and diathesis shows not only roles but also ranks of the participants then the input to the surface case frame should take the rank into consideration, ranks of participants being a separate factor in the verb’s lexical semantics.

- 3) The fact that Unspecified Adjunct deletion is needed to account for the missing Background Causer interpretation brings to light the fact that, contrary to what is often assumed, there is no general rule of interpretation for missing adjuncts. Possible non-existence of the participant Causer cannot be the consequence of the mere fact that in the semantics of decausatives it becomes an Adjunct.

The participant Starting Point in the semantics of *come*, for example, is also an Adjunct. But it necessarily exists, because every material object is situated at some place, so arriving in one place it ceases to be in the other.

Though Russian and English decausatives have very much in common semantically there is a difference in that in Russian decausatives are much more productive. Take, for example, English *exhaust*, *delete*, *erase*, *ruin*, which do not decausativize, while their Russian equivalents *istoščit'*, *unichtožit'*, *steret'*, *razorit'* do. The fact that in Russian decausatives are morphologically marked may be an important distinguishing factor, though, perhaps, more convincing explanations can be found in the future.

References

- Bulaxovskij L.A. (1954) *Russkij literaturnyj jazyk pervoj poloviny XIX veka*. Moscow.
- Benveniste E. (1971) *Problems in general linguistics*. Miami, FL: University of Miami Press.
- Brown G. and Yule G. (1983) *Discourse analysis*. Cambridge University press.
- Comrie B. (1985) «Causative verb formation and other verb deriving morphology». Shopen T. (ed.) *Language typology and syntactic description*. Vol. III: Grammatical categories and lexicon. Cambridge: Cambridge UP: 301-348.
- Croft, W.A. (1991) *Syntactic Categories and Grammatical Relations*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- DeLancey, S. (1984). «Notes on Agentivity and Causation». *Studies in Language* 8: 181-213.
- Dowty, David. (1979) *Word Meaning and Montague Grammar. The Semantics of Verbs and Times in Generative Semantics and in Montague's PTQ*. Dordrecht: Reidel.
- Dowty, David. 1991. Thematic proto-roles and argument selection. *Language* 67:547-619.
- Fillmore, Charles. (1976) «The need for a frame semantics within linguistics». *Statistical Methods in Linguistics*, vol. 1: 37-41.
- Goddard, Cliff (1998) *Semantic analysis: a practical introduction*. Oxford Univ. Press, 1998.
- Haspelmath, Martin. (1993) «More on typology of the inchoative/causative alternations». B.Comrie and M.Polinsky (eds.) *Causation and transitivity*. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: Benjamins.
- Iordanskaja L.N. and Igor A.Mel'čuk. (1996) «K semantike russkix prichinnyx predlogov». *Moskovskij lingvističeskij žurnal*: 2, Moscow: RGGU: 162-211.

- Jackendoff, Ray. (1990) *Semantic structures*. Cambridge etc.
- Kustova G.I. and Elena V. Paducheva (1994) «Semantic dictionary as a lexical database». EURALEX-1994, Proceedings. Amsterdam: 479-485.
- Lakoff, George. (1977) «Linguistic gestalten». *Papers from the 13-th Regional meeting Chicago linguistic society*. Chicago.
- Leech, Geoffrey. (1983) *Principles of pragmatics*. London, New York: Longmans.
- Levin, Beth and Rappaport Hovav M. (1995) *Unaccusativity: At the syntax-lexical semantics interface*. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
- Levin, Beth and Rappaport Hovav M. (1998) «Building verb meaning». *Projection of arguments: lexical and compositional factors*. CSLI publications: 97-134.
- Mel'čuk, Igor A. (1998) *Kurs obščej morfologii*. V. II, Moskva – Vena.
- Mel'čuk, Igor A. and Xolodovich A.A. (1970) «K teorij grammatičeskogo zaloga». *Narody Azii i Afriki*, 4: 111-124.
- Nedjalkov V.P. and Sil'nickij G.G. (1969) «Tipologija kauzativnyx konstrukcij». Xolodovič A.A. (ed.) *Tipologija kauzativnyx konstrukcij*. Morfoložičeskij kauzativ. Leningrad.: Nauka, 5-19.
- Paducheva, ElenaV. (1996) *Semantičeskie issledovanija. Semantika vremeni i vida v ruskom jazyke. Semantika narrativa*. Moscow: Jazyki ruskoj kul'tury.
- Paducheva, ElenaV. (1998) «Paradigms of semantic derivation for Russian verbs of sound». *Acts EURALEX'98*, v.1, Liege 1998: 231-238.
- Paducheva, ElenaV. (1997) *Semantičeskie roli i problema soxranenija invarianta pri leksičeskoj derivacii*. *Naučno-texničeskaja informacija*, ser.2, N 1: 18-30.
- Plungjan V.A. (2000) *Obščaja morfologija*. Moskva: Editorial URSS.
- Spencer, Andrew (1998) «Middles and genericity». *Essex research reports in linguistics*. University of Essex. Dept. of language and linguistic.
- Van Valin, R.D., Jr. and D.P. Wilkins. (1996) «The Case for 'Effector': Case Roles, Agents and Agency Revisited». M. Shibatani and S.A. Thompson, eds. *Grammatical Constructions*. Oxford: Clarendon Press: 289-322.
- Wade T. (2000) *A comprehensive Russian grammar*. 2nd edition. Malden: Blackwell.
- Wierzbicka, Anna (1980) *Lingua mentalis*. Sydney etc.: Acad. press.
- Wierzbicka, Anna (1996) *Semantics: primes and universals*. Oxford, N.Y.: Oxford Univ. Press.